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George Washington 

AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 



JAMES HOSMER PENNIMAN, LITT.D, 



GEORGE WASHINGTON 

AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 



BY 

James Hosmer Penniman, Litt. D. 



COPYRIGHT 

JAMES H. PENNIMAN 

1917 



GEORGE WASHINGTON 

AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 

To no other human cause is the success of the 
Americans struggling with the Mother Country in 
the War of the Revolution due so largely as to the 
tenacity of purpose of the extraordinary man who 
led their forces, added to the remarkable fact that 
he who assumed command under the Old Elm at 
Cambridge in 1775, remained Commander-in-Chief 
throughout the long war, and in 1781 forced Corn- 
wallis to surrender at Yorktown. 

Though Washington exposed himself with dash- 
ing courage, there is no record of his having been 
wounded. Though seriously ill a number of times 
before and after the war, he was always in full 
possession of his faculties during the Revolution. 
When we recall that the disastrous surprise at 
Brooklyn has been attributed to the sickness of 
General Greene, we are able to form an idea of what 
a calamity it would have been if through wounds or 
disease the watchful eye of the Commander-in-Chief 
had grown dim and that vigorous mind had relaxed 
its anxious thought. 

The occupation of cities by the British was 
always of minor importance; the independence of 
America depended on her ability to keep an army in 
the field. Through Washington's efforts for eight 
years, an army was always ready and he was always 
at his post. During the war he left the army on 
few occasions, and then only when public business 
required his presence elsewhere. Washington was 
always the principal character on the stage of the 

©C!,A4r>n903 

m 17 1917 

^1.!S . / . 



Revolutionary War, the pivot around which every- 
thing else revolved. He had to contend with untold 
difficulties, with poverty, with cold, with hunger, 
with shiftlessness, with envy, with treachery, with 
hostile criticism, with jealousy, and with stupidity. 
Early in the war he wrote: "I know the unhappy 
predicament I stand in ; I know that much is expected 
of me; I know that without men, without arms, 
without ammunition, without anything fit for the 
accommodation of a soldier, little is to be done; 
and, what is mortifying, I know that I cannot stand 
justified to the world without exposing my own 
weakness, and injuring the cause, which I am 
determined not to do. . . . My own situation is 
so irksome to me at times, that, if I did not consult 
the public good more than my own tranquillity, I 
should, long ere this, have put everything on the cast 
of a die." 

His success was due to constant striving against 
adverse circumstances; he had remarkable fore- 
thought, but he anticipated difficulties only to over- 
come them. Misfortunes and accidents retarded but 
did not arrest his progress. He was always prepared 
for reverses, and had a way of retreat ready. When 
his army was defeated it was not routed, and was 
able to attack again as soon as an opportunity pre- 
sented itself. Never unduly elated by success, he was 
never nobler than in disaster, and at no time more 
dangerous than when he seemed defeated; for no 
man was more ready than he to profit by the 
mistakes of his opponent, and no man was swifter to 
retrieve his own errors. As was remarked of 
Napoleon, "To say that he committed faults is only 
to say that he made war," but Washington's military 
misfortunes were usually of such a character as to 
add to his renown. His bringing a beaten army of 



raw troops to fight bravely a few days after defeat, 
as he did at Germantown, aroused the admiration of 
the military experts of Europe; and no commander 
ever gave a grander exhibition of personal power 
than did Washington when he rallied the fleeing 
forces of Charles Lee and sent them back to the fight 
at Monmouth. No matter how few in numbers, an 
army commanded by Washington was always formi- 
dable, for he knew how to adapt his undertakings to 
the means at his disposal. He took advantage of 
every opportunity, and when an opportunity did not 
present itself, he created one. His force was not 
only usually weaker numerically than that of the 
enemy, but also inferior in discipline and military 
training; but so great was his personal influence, 
and such his skill in seizing on natural advan- 
tages of position, in reinforcing them by all the 
known devices of military art and by others hitherto 
unknown which he originated, that he outmaneuvred 
the British generals and often forced them to keep on 
the defensive or to withdraw. His success was 
largely due to his wonderful skill in putting his force 
exactly where it would do most good. His experi- 
ence as a surveyor gave him a knowledge of topog- 
raphy and an ability to select the strongest position, 
that was superior to that of any other man in 
either army. 

He did not trust to others the important work 
of reconnoitering, if it was possible to do it himself. 
Money spent on reconnoitering excursions forms one 
of the most frequent items in his accounts ; and roads, 
rivers, fords, mountain passes, and elevated positions 
were always studied by him with the utmost care. 
That communication between the Northern and 
Southern States, which was essential to the suc- 
cess of the American cause, was always kept open 



throughout the war, was due to his study of the 
country around the Hudson, and to his occupation of 
West Point and the Highland passes which controlled 
that river. More than any battles that he fought, his 
selection of positions like West Point, Morristown 
and Valley Forge, kept the British in constant 
danger; for in these places he could not be attacked 
to advantage; he could easily retreat if necessary; 
such supplies as the country afforded were within his 
reach ; he could harass British foraging parties and 
prevent intercourse vdth the surrounding country; 
and if the enemy moved in force, he was ready to hang 
on his flanks and cut his communications. He kept 
informed of the intentions of the British, for his 
spies were continually coming and going. Washing- 
ton's perception of the enemy's plans and his 
ingenuity in using the means at his disposal for 
overthrowing them were the result of the power 
which he constantly exercised of putting himself in 
the place of the opposing general, and of divining his 
plans by imagining what he himself would do in sim- 
ilar circumstances; so that he knew what General 
Howe ought to do better than Howe himself, and was 
at times puzzled because Howe blindly refused to do 
what was obviously to his great advantage; as, for 
example, when Howe went to Philadelphia instead of 
up the Hudson to the relief of Burgoyne. This 
was the greatest mistake that the British made 
during the war. 

Most of the campaigns of the Revolution were 
planned by Washington, even those in which he did 
not take part. His papers describe many projects 
which, though carefully devised, came to nothing 
through the incompetence of subordinates, lack of 
means to provide the ordinary requisites of military 
operations, or through other circumstances which 



could not be anticipated or prevented. His actions 
were based upon a broad foundation of common 
sense, but, as Dr. Weir Mitchell said, *'If common 
sense explains his life, it was common sense lifted to 
the level of genius." Edward Everett thought that 
the most striking trait of Washington's character 
was judicial moderation. He did not make up his 
mind hastily. As soon as he awoke in the morning, 
he mapped out the business of the day; and he fre- 
quently retired to some quiet place for periods of 
prayer and meditation. He gave due weight to the 
opinions of others, but had the force of character to 
act on his own responsibility, and when he had done 
his utmost, he was content to abide by the decision of 
Providence. Avoiding side issues, his mind went 
straight to the point. As soon as he was sure of his 
opponent's intentions, his energies were concentrated 
on the vital spot to defeat them. When his plan was 
formed, he was swift to carry it out. One of his prin- 
ciples was, when you cannot win, make it as hard for 
the enemy as you can. He fought every inch of the 
way where it was possible, but no one could withdraw 
quicker than he when circumstances demanded. 
Nothing but his promptness in this respect saved 
the army at Brooklyn and at Trenton. On each of 
these occasions the British retired to rest with the 
expectation of annihilating the Americans in the 
morning, but during the night Washington had van- 
ished with his army. Though the British employed 
many devices to draw him into false movements, he 
refused to be entrapped by them; and on the other 
hand, he was ever ready to take advantage of 
mistakes on their part. Too wary to allow himself 
to be surprised, he understood the power of surprise 
to help a weaker force, and made use of it at Trenton, 
Germantown and Stony Point. No one appreciated 

6 



better than Washington the axiom that in military 
operations time is everything, for time was his most 
powerful ally. While time was passing, the British 
were spending vast sums on their army and fleet; 
public opinion in opposition to the will of George III 
was gaining strength in England; the French were 
being won over ; raw recruits were being disciplined 
into an army; and the thirteen colonies were being 
welded into a nation. From the beginning of the 
war, well-trained armies of professional soldiers were 
contending with the American people; and though 
the Americans were brave, and accustomed to the 
use of arms from youth, they learned by sad experi- 
ence at Brooklyn and New York that bodies of men 
do not make an army unless they are properly 
disciplined. No one realized this more fully than 
Washington, and he was constantly writing moni- 
tions like these : "Discipline is the soul of an army — 
it makes small numbers formidable — procures suc- 
cess to the weak, and esteem to all." "Strict order is 
the life of military discipline." "To make men well 
acquainted with the duties of a soldier requires time ; 
to bring them under proper discipline and subordina- 
tion not only requires time, but is a work of great 
difficulty; and in this army, where there is so little 
distinction between officers and soldiers, requires an 
uncommon degree of attention. To expect, then, the 
same service from raw and undisciplined recruits as 
from veteran soldiers, is to expect what never did, 
and perhaps never will happen." 

To Colonel William Woodford, he wrote, Novem- 
ber 10, 1775, "Be strict in your discipline; that is, 
require nothing unreasonable of your officers and 
men, but see that whatever is required be punctually 
complied with. Reward and punish every man 
according to his merit, without partiality or preju- 



dice; hear his complaints; if well founded, redress 
them; if otherwise, discourage them, in order to 
prevent frivolous ones. Discourage vice in every 
shape, and impress upon the mind of every man, 
from the first to the lowest, the importance of the 
cause, and what it is they are contending for. For- 
ever keep in view the necessity of guarding against 
surprises. In all your marches, at times, at least, 
even when there is no possible danger, move with 
front, rear and flank guards, that they may be 
familiarized to the use; and be regular in your 
encampments, appointing necessary guards for the 
security of your camp. In short, whether you expect 
an enemy or not, this should be practiced ; otherwise 
your attempts will be confused and awkward when 
necessary. Be plain and precise in your orders, and 
keep copies of them to refer to, that no mistakes may 
happen. Be easy and condescending in your deport- 
ment to your officers, but not too familiar, lest you 
subject yourself to a want of that respect, which is 
necessary to support a proper command." 

Under Washington, the character of the army 
was constantly improving. He patiently reconciled 
the prejudices and jealousies of the men of the vari- 
ous colonies, and was always trying to organize an 
American army. When in camp, all general and field 
officers dined with him every day at three; so the 
General kept in touch with his men, and they became 
comrades. He began this custom as soon as he took 
command at Cambridge. Wherever it was possible, 
he personally saw the officers whom he entrusted 
with important work. His success was largely due 
to his shrewdness in dealing with men and to his 
ability to select the right man for the place. He knew 
mankind from lifelong and active experience, in the 
House of Burgesses of Virginia, in Congress, in the 

8 



Army, on the farm, and in the forest! He under- 
stood the motives and dispositions of such various 
races as Americans, British, French, Indians and 
negroes. The range of his experience extended over 
the whole gamut of human nature, from the selfish- 
ness of an Arnold or a Gates to the lofty patriotism of 
a Lafayette or a Greene, whose highest ambition was 
to act at all times as Washington would have done. 

Experience had taught him not to expect too 
much, and he wrote Philip Schuyler : "We must bear 
up — and make the best of mankind as they are, since 
we cannot have them as we wish ;" a sentiment which 
reminds us of the epigrams of Montaigne. The con- 
fidence which existed between Washington and men 
like Greene, Knox and Lafayette, was a charming 
feature of the war. It is said that even thirty years 
after, Washington's officers could not speak of his 
farewell without tears. The devotion of his friends 
and neighbors was conspicuous throughout his career. 
He had the confidence of men of influence, and he 
utilized their attachment to him for the good of his 
country as no other man in America could have done. 
Knox wrote him : "I know that the people of America 
look up to you as their Father, and into your hands 
they trust their all, confident of every exertion on 
your part for their security and happiness ; and I do 
not believe there is any man on earth for whose wel- 
fare there are more solicitations at the Court of 
Heaven than for yours." 

Washington received cruel wounds from some 
who pretended to be his friends, who found it the 
easier to attack him because he could not reply to 
their charges of inefficiency without informing the 
enemy of his lack of powder and of every other mil- 
itary necessity. He had a deep aversion to contro- 
versies, and especially tried to avoid feuds that might 



injure the American cause. He never took up a 
quarrel unless it was forced upon him; but when it 
was necessary, he acted with decision, and showed 
people with such different kinds of presumption as 
Lord Howe, Gates and Conway that it was not safe 
to take liberties with him. In spite of experiences 
with traitors like Charles Lee and Arnold, he never 
lost faith in humanity, and he loved to believe that 
other men were as noble-natured as himself. His 
reason controlled his passions, so that even his ene- 
mies respected him. His acts and words were those 
of a gentleman, and the grand manner which he 
learned in youth from Lord Fairfax he always 
retained. When necessary he could be severe, but his 
own inclination was always toward mercy. He never 
permitted his personal feelings to stand in the 
way of his duty, and his example was the most 
powerful influence. 

Washington was a careful observer and listener. 
He was everywhere, his eye saw everything, and 
there was a sternness in that eye that no man whose 
work was not well done would willingly face. Though 
he saw all, he said little, but, when circumstances 
warranted it, he could speak such burning words that 
Henry Lee said he was like the torrent of Niagara. 
Yet he did not bear malice, and he wrote that he 
never said anything of a man that he would not say 
to him. No greater evidence of his wonderful per- 
sonality could be given than the way in which he 
immediately won the respect, admiration and affec- 
tion of accomplished Frenchmen, when the whirligig 
of time had made those against whom he contended 
in his youth the allies of his later years. Rocham- 
beau said that he never knew what true glory was, 
nor a truly great man, till he met Washington. 

10 



It is hardly possible to give a better picture of 
Washington during the Revolution than those few 
words of Mr. Owen Wister, which describe him as 
**hurrying somewhere on a horse with ragged soldiers 
behind him." One might preach a sermon on Wash- 
ington with these words as a text, for every one is 
big with meaning. Hurrying indicates strength, 
energy and zeal. Somewhere, not anywhere, to a 
place carefully chosen where he could do the utmost 
for his country. On a horse — Jefferson said he was 
the best horseman of his age, and history and art 
alike record no nobler figure than Washington on 
horseback. Ragged — his men were ragged because 
they were giving up all to fight for the country which 
did not pay them even the pittance it had agreed to. 
The Americans were the most hard-working, honest 
and thrifty people on earth, and were never ragged 
except when serving in the Continental Army. 
Behind him — they were backing him up to the extent 
of their ability, because he had won their hearts. 
For, however he might be criticized by those who 
planned campaigns by the warm fireside, he had the 
confidence of the freezing, starving heroes around 
him. It was serious business to serve under Wash- 
ington. He was a leader who could make men do 
things. As soon as recruits saw him, they felt that 
here was a man on whom they could rely to the last 
extremity, and it was this that sustained his men at 
Brooklyn and Trenton. No one but him could have 
kept the army together during those weary months 
at Valley Forge and Morristown. As Archibald 
Forbes said of Skobelev : "He radiated from him the 
mysterious irresistible magnetism that inspired men 
to follow him, to use the rough soldier-phrase, 
'through hell and out at the farther side.' " Like 
Napoleon, he kept in touch with his men, and 

11 



explained the situation to them and appealed to their 
patriotism when great efforts were needed. Patriot- 
ism may generally be said to diminish in propor- 
tion to the distance from home, perhaps even as the 
square of the distance; but the men who followed 
Washington thought that it was their duty to obey 
wherever they were, in hunger and cold and rags, 
and to die obeying. His courage was the admiration 
of his men : the only thing they had against him was 
the fearless way in which he exposed himself; but, 
though he risked his own life, he was careful not to 
endanger theirs unless it was necessary, and his 
anguish at the useless exposure of his troops at 
Brooklyn is recorded by eye-witnesses. 

In times of danger his mind worked more 
quickly, and a fellow Virginian described him as 
being as cool in action as a bishop at his prayers. 
Jefferson said that he was "incapable of fear, meet- 
ing personal dangers with the cahnest unconcern." 
Washington not only had courage under fire, but he 
had what is far more unusual and what was much 
more valuable to the cause for which he was con- 
tending — he had the fortitude to endure suffering, 
suspicion, want, and physical and mental weariness, 
without losing faith in the cause and in mankind. 
The one thing that made him lose his self-control was 
cowardice on the part of his men ; and on the other 
hand, his admiration of bravery was such that, 
although usually a remarkable judge of character, he 
overlooked Benedict Arnold's failings, and appointed 
him to the most responsible position at his disposal. 
This was perhaps the greatest mistake that Wash- 
ington made during the war, and an explanation of 
it may be found in the possibility that, as sometimes 
happens, Arnold's severe wounds had caused a 
deterioration in his moral fibre. It is interesting to 

12 



note that the difference between the enduring forti- 
tude of a Washington and the rash gallantry of a 
Benedict Arnold was observed centuries ago; for 
Plato says that a mind prepared to meet danger, if 
impelled by its own eagerness rather than by the 
public good, deserves more the name of audacity than 
of courage. Though as devoted to the occupations 
of peace as any man in America, when aroused 
Washington had a flaming ardor of combativity 
which illuminated the darkest circumstances ; so that 
it was said that **Hope shone in him Hke a pillar of 
fire, when it had gone out in all other men." No one 
understood better than he the axiom that it is not 
the actual loss of men in battle which is disastrous 
so much as the resulting discouragement which 
deprives the remaining forces of their power to 
continue the struggle. It was always necessary for 
him to act in such a manner as to keep up the spirits 
of the army and of the nation. This was his most 
important work. Public opinion at times forced him 
to attempt what was not in accordance with his own 
views or with military policy. He fought the Battle 
of the Brandywine, for instance, in the vain attempt 
to keep the superior force of Lord Howe from the 
occupation of Philadelphia, which proved to be of 
little use to them. The short periods of enlistment 
caused it to be said that he was obHged to carry on 
war, "not according to military opportunities, but 
according to the calendar." And he wrote, "it is 
as easy to stop a torrent as the soldiers when their 
time is up." 

The might of Washington's sword depended, to 
a much greater extent than is generally realized, 
upon the power of his pen. Throughout the Revolu- 
tion he was busy writing instructions for his men, 
letters to Congress, to Lord Howe, to Brother 

13 



Jonathan Trumbull, to people of influence every- 
where. He was the most productive of American 
writers; the collection of his manuscripts in the 
Library of Congress is known to be the largest of 
any one man in the world. In the calendar of his 
letters to the Continental Congress from 1775 to 1783 
are about two thousand letters, or nearly one a day, 
and he wrote about seven thousand other military 
letters in the same period. He also wrote at this 
time numerous letters to his wife, only one of which 
has been preserved, and a very long weekly letter to 
Lund Washington about the management of affairs 
at Mount Vernon. In addition to these, he wrote 
many other letters of business, ceremony or friend- 
ship during the war. The letters written by his 
secretaries were revised by him, and elaborate drafts 
of official letters, entirely in the handwriting of 
Washington, were often prepared in moments 
snatched from needed repose, and sometimes in the 
midst of actual danger. Yet his high-toned manner 
never forsook him, and he always wrote like a 
gentleman. No military man and few men of letters 
have been able to use the English language more 
skillfully, and his style was singuarly concise, accu- 
rate and direct. Guizot said that Washington was 
endowed to an extraordinary degree with the power 
of influencing men by "honorable sentiments and by 
truth"; but though much was due to his persuasive 
charm, his words also commanded respect, because 
it was felt that, to apply to him an expression of 
Alphonse Daudet, he could make powder talk as well 
as ink. The influence of Washington's letters in 
forming public opinion throughout the war was 
enormous, for such was the confidence in his relia- 
bility and integrity that when, for instance. Governor 
Jonathan Trumbull received a letter from General 

14 



Washington stating that supplies were needed, every 
nerve was strained to meet the demand. 

Washington's tact, patience and wisdom were 
nowhere more conspicuous than in his letters to 
Congress; nominally its servant, he often inspired 
and directed it. No other man possessed its confidence 
to such a degree; so that, though Congress was 
always jealous of military dominion, when there was 
the greatest danger it did not hesitate to invest him 
with dictatorial power. He was especially busy 
during the winters in urging Congress and the 
governors of the States to take the necessary steps 
for raising and subsisting a suitable army, in caring 
for the little band of ragged patriots hutted around 
him, and in preparing for the summer campaign. 
These were tasks of the utmost difficulty, for the 
system of government of the colonies was dis- 
arranged by the outbreak of the war, and such 
authority as existed was mostly in the hands of 
Committees of Safety, with no legal powers, whose 
duties were vaguely defined. Yet so great was the 
intelligence and patriotism of the people, that there 
was little crime or disorder. 

Washington's ability to select important points 
from masses of detail, to winnow the true from the 
false, and to size up a situation, was little short of 
marvellous. He always had the latest and fullest 
intelligence, and it is not easy to realize the difficulty 
of obtaining reliable information during the Revolu- 
tion. Communication was slow, and dangerous; 
opportunities for observation were restricted ; news- 
papers were issued irregularly, and had only a lim- 
ited circulation. Washington took personal charge 
of the Secret Service, and had gold for this depart- 
ment when gold was a curiosity and there was noth- 
ing but paper money for all other purposes. General 

15 



Greene voiced the opinion of his chief when he wrote : 
"Spies are the eyes of an army, and without them, a 
general is always groping in the dark." Many of 
Washington's spies were known to him alone; they 
used invisible ink, and important papers were often 
concealed in the pommel of a saddle, or in buttons. 
The success at Trenton is attributable to two causes : 
to the accurate information which Washington's spies 
brought him of the numbers, disposition and condi- 
tion of the Hessians; and to Washington's fore- 
thought in taking the unusual number of eighteen 
cannon with his force of only twenty-four hundred 
men. That stormy morning, muskets were mostly 
wet and useless, but cannon could be employed in any 
weather, and six guns pointed at two regiments of 
Hessians at less than three hundred yards, decided 
the contest before it began. 

Washington constantly felt his lack of theoretical 
training in military affairs, and late in life he wrote : 
"A thorough examination of the subject will evince 
that the art of war is extensive and complicated ; that 
it demands much previous study; and that the pos- 
session of it in its most important and perfect state 
is always of great moment to the security of a 
nation." 

As a young man, he read a translation of 
Caesar's Commentaries, and must have studied other 
military works ; for, in 1754, William Fairfax wrote 
him these memorable words: "In the Duke of 
Marlborough's campaign you'll observe many wise 
retreats performed that were not called flights" — 
words which were, no doubt, in Washington's mind 
as he retired in that masterly way through New 
Jersey late in 1776. Marlborough learned the art of 
war from Turenne, Conde, and Vauban, the great 
masters of his time, under whom he served for five 

16 



years. With the single exception of General Brad- 
dock, who, it may be assumed, learned more from 
Washington than Washington did from him, he never 
served under any one who could give him any military 
instruction whatever. The principal advantage he 
derived from the campaign with Braddock was 
the opportunity for observation of the British 
regular, collectively and individually, observation 
which doubtless formed the basis of much of his 
subsequent success. He was always a thorough, 
hard-working student of subjects like Agriculture, 
Military Affairs, and Government, which it was his 
business to know; and he spared no trouble or 
expense to obtain the best books, and made careful 
abstracts of them, some of which may be seen among 
his manuscripts in the Library of Congress. In 1775 
he recommended one of his officers to familiarize 
himself with Bland's Essay on the Art of War, 
Instructions for Officers, The Partisan, Young, and 
others. Among the m.ilitary books in his library were 
Otway's Art of War, The Doctrine of Projectiles, 
Daveis's Cavalry, Simm's Military Course, A Work 
on Manoeuvres, Stevenson's Military Instructions for 
Officers Detached in the Field, Count Saxe's Plan for 
New Modeling the French Army, A New System of 
Mihtary Discipline, Prussian Evolutions in Actual 
Engagements, Code of Military Standing Resolutions, 
Claviac's Field Engineer, Miiller on Fortification, 
Anderson's Essays on Field Artillery, A System of 
Camp Discipline, Vallancey on Fortification, Picker- 
ing's Militia, Steuben's Regulations for the Order 
and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, 
Traite de Cavalerie, Webb's Treatise on the Ap- 
pointments of the Army, De Jeney's The Partisan, 
or the Art of Making War in Detachment, The 
Military Guide, The Duties of Soldiers in General. 

17 



Few men have ever learned the trade of the 
soldier in a harder school of practical experience, and 
no man ever paid a higher price in work and dis- 
comfort for the honors that he gained. No better 
training could have been provided for the command 
of the Revolutionary Armies than Washington's 
apprenticeship in the Virginia forces from 1751 to 
1758. He learned then how to deal with untrained 
soldiers, with disciplined British troops, with French, 
Indians, colonists, and with a Colonial Legislature; 
and he then acquired the habit of accomplishing 
results with feeble resources, which remained with 
him through life. In spite of his lack of military 
training on a large scale, Washington was far better 
equipped than the British generals for the conduct of 
the war in America; for he understood the country 
and the people as did no other man, with the possible 
exception of Franklin. He had in an unusual degree a 
combination of opposite qualities of the utmost value 
to a commander. Because of his broad common sense, 
severity was tempered by clemency, audacity by 
caution ; and no other general has ever been able to 
take a more comprehensive view of the whole field of 
affairs and at the same time to devote such concen- 
trated attention to details. 

Much of the routine of the soldier's trade is sim- 
ilar to that of any other business, so that the careful 
work which he performed in the management of the 
large estates in Virginia was an excellent prepara- 
tion for the task of providing food, clothes, powder, 
guns, transportation, money and men for his army; 
for he had to feed, move and pay it, while contending 
with the perfectly appointed forces of the richest 
nation in the world ; and he did all these things under 
a fire of criticism at home that was far more difficult 
to endure than that of the enemies' guns. Nothing 

18 



with regard to his troops was too minute for his 
attention. 

"While at the head of the army," says Sparks, 
"the names and rank of the officers, the returns of the 
adjutants, commissaries, and quartermasters, were 
compressed by him into systematic tables, so con- 
trived as to fix strongly in his mind the most essential 
parts, without being encumbered with details. When 
the army was to march, or perform any movements 
requiring combination and concert, a scheme was 
first delineated; and at the beginning of an active 
campaign, or in the preparation for a detached enter- 
prise, the line of battle was projected and sketched 
on paper, each officer being assigned to his post, with 
the names of the regiment and strength of the forces 
he was to command." Ever the best fitted for 
military command, Washington was always the last 
to seek it. He never overestimated himself, and was 
always ready to recognize his faults and correct them. 
He said, "I do not think vanity is a trait of my char- 
acter." He rarely talked of what he was going to do, 
and never boasted of what he had done. He was 
always more interested in the present and future than 
in the past. He cared for the success of the cause 
rather than for his own glory, and did not hesitate 
to send his best troops when they could be of use to 
other generals — a service which was not returned at 
times of his urgent necessity ; for instance, Washing- 
ton said that if, after the surrender of Burgoyne, 
Gates had promptly sent back Morgan's riflemen and 
the other troops which he had despatched to his aid, 
the forts on the Delaware could have been held, 
Howe's army in Philadelphia starved out, and the 
war shortened by several years. Washington sought 
nothing for himself, and declined all payment for his 
services during the struggle with Great Britain. It 

19 



is said that the only personal request he ever made 
of the Government was that he might be permitted 
to retain his original commission. It is now^ in the 
Headquarters at Morristown. 

General Washington's military talents were the 
development of unusual natural qualities trained by 
a long series of Divinely guided experiences. The 
stripling who professed himself charmed by the 
whistling of bullets, in the process of time grew into 
the stern yet tender-hearted warrior who at Brooklyn 
was in agony at the loss of his men. At twenty-two, 
Washington wrote 'my inclinations are strongly bent 
to arms." After the Revolution, at fifty-three, he 
called war "this plague to mankind," and said "my 
first wish is to see it banished from off the earth." 
Yet it was always his opinion that "to be prepared 
for war is the most effective means to promote 
peace." His last letter, written two days before his 
death, was to Alexander Hamilton, on the establish- 
ment of a military academy, which he described as an 
object of primary importance to this country. 



20 



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